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Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right
to Record the Police
JOCELYN SIMONSON*
This symposium Article articulates and defends a robust First Amend-
ment right to record the police up to the point that the act of filming
presents a concrete, physical impediment to a police officer or public
safety. To the extent that courts have identified the constitutional values
behind the right to record, they have, for the most part, relied on the idea
that filming the police promotes public discourse by facilitating the free
discussion of governmental affairs. Like limiting the gathering of news,
limiting the filming of the police constricts the information in the public
sphere from which the public can draw and debate. I contend that this
account of the constitutional values behind the right to record is correct
but incomplete, for it sets aside the ways in which the act of recording an
officer in the open is a form of expression in the moment, a gesture of
resistance to the power of the police over the community. In order to flesh
out this function of civilian recording as resistance, this Article contrasts
civilian filming of the police with the use of police-worn body cameras:
while both forms of film are useful to deter misconduct and document
police activity, only civilian filming allows civilians to express ownership
over their streets and neighborhoods. Ultimately, I argue that a jurispru-
dence of the right to record should account for both the benefits to public
discourse and the in-the-moment communication to officers that can be
found when civilians record the police.
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INTRODUCTION
Too often, American police officers are taught that their job is to control the
streets and the roads that they police-to "own" the neighborhood. For ex-
ample, in 2009 a New York Police Department (NYPD) Lieutenant instructed
his officers during the "roll call" at the beginning of a shift at the 81st Precinct
in Bedford Stuyvesant, Brooklyn:
[W]e've got to keep the corner clear.... Because if you get too big of a
crowd there, you know,... they're going to think that they own the block. We
own the block. They don't own the block, all right? They might live there but
we own the block. All right? We own the streets here. You tell them what to
do. 2
These words were secretly recorded by one of the gathered officers, who later
testified in the successful class action litigation challenging the NYPD's stop-and-
frisk practices as unconstitutional.3 As the District Judge noted when she quoted
the above words, "[b]ecause Bedford Stuyvesant is a historically black neighbor-
hood and continues to have a majority black population, [the] Lieutenant[]'s
comment carries troubling racial overtones." 4 Indeed, the history of local police
officers in poor neighborhoods of color is one of domination, of playing the
role, in James Baldwin's words, of "occupying solider[s]." '
It is in this context-the deliberate and longstanding power differential
between police officers and the communities that they police-that, in this
Article, I discuss the importance of civilian recording of the police and defend a
robust interpretation of a First Amendment right to record the police. The act of
filming itself entails a transfer of power from the police to the community. A
resident of Bedford Stuyvesant who takes out her cell phone, stands near a
police officer, and records that police officer on duty not only records a video of
that officer's conduct for possible future use, but also expresses to the officer in
that moment: I am watching you; I have ownership over this block too.
This expression of ownership is one that makes police officers bristle. Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James Comey, for example, has argued
that police officers are "under siege" by civilians holding cameras, contending
that the filming of police officers has led to a slowdown in proactive and
1. See Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement's "Warrior" Problem, 128 HARV. L. REv. F. 225, 229 (2015)
(describing how "[e]ither through formal training or informal example, officers learn to both verbally
and physically control the space they operate in").
2. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (remedial opinion).
3. See id. at 561-63.
4. Id. at 597.
5. JAMES BALDWIN, NOBODY KNOWS My NAME: MORE NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 66 (Vintage Int'l 1993)
(1961) ("[The policeman] moves through Harlem, therefore, like an occupying soldier in a bitterly
hostile country; which is precisely what, and where, he is, and is the reason he walks in twos and
threes.").
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effective police work.6 If we recognize that the value of filming police as speech
lies not only in its future contributions to public discourse and democratic
dialogue, but also to that in-the-moment communication to police officers, then
we can understand the feeling of intrusion experienced by police officers and
why, despite that feeling, the expressive act of filming is still constitutionally
valuable speech.7 For civilian filming of the police is not only a tool of police
accountability, but also a method of power transfer from police officers to the
populations that they police.
As videos of police officers taken by civilians become a regular part of the
national conversation surrounding policing,8 it has become routine to hear
experts and laypeople alike declare that there is a First Amendment "right to
record" the police. 9 That right, however, is not yet settled law. Although four
circuit courts-the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits-have found
such a First Amendment right to record the police, 0 in many other federal
jurisdictions, courts have yet to clearly articulate a right to record, and some
courts have even expressed doubt as to whether the right should exist at all. 1
Indeed, in 2015, district courts within at least five different circuits held that
6. See James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the University of Chicago
School of Law (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/law-enforcement-and-the-
communities-we-serve-bending-the-lines-toward-safety-and-justice [perma.cc/PKQ3-7NDH]. These com-
ments from Director Comey followed a Washington Post report that the consensus at a meeting of 100
police leaders from around the country was that the police in America are "under siege" by the
onslaught of civilian bystanders filming their every move. See Aaron C. Davis, 'YouTube Effect' Has
Left Police Officers Under Siege, Law Enforcement Leaders Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/10 /8/youtube- effect-has- left-police- officers -under-
siege-law-enforcement-leaders- say/ [perma.cc/9M6E-3CD2]. However, social scientists have debunked
the contention that there has been a so-called "Ferguson Effect," in which crime has increased as a
result of protests against police violence. See, e.g., David Pyrooz et al., Was There a Ferguson Effect on
Crime Rates in Large U.S. Cities?, 46 J. CRIM. JUST. (forthcoming Sept. 2016); RICHARD ROSENFELD, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, WAS THERE A "FERGUSON EFFECT" ON CRIME IN ST. Louis? (2015), http://
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc-Ferguson Effect.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7WF-UJ7B].
7. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987) ("The freedom of individuals verbally
to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics
by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.").
8. See generally Richard P6rez-Pena & Timothy Williams, Glare of Video is Shifting Public's View of
Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/31/us/through-lens-of-video-a-
transformed-view-of-police.html? r-0 [https://perma.cc/NQ6Z-2JMG].
9. See, e.g., Robert Greenwald & Vanessa Baden Kelly, Keeping Truth Legal: It is Our Right to Film
Police, HUFFINGTON POST (May 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-greenwald/keeping-truth-
legal-it-is b 7347746.html [perma.cc/6NZR-HUMD]; Alessandra Ram, It's Your Right to Film the
Police. These Apps Can Help, WIRED (May 3, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/right-film-
police-apps-can-help/ [https://perma.cc/3K2E-6PA5]; cf. ACLU, Know Your Rights: Photographers,
https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights-photographers [perma.cc/SN7U-96A3] (last updated July 2014)
(describing filming police officers in public as a constitutional right).
10. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 608 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85
(1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of
Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Adkins v. Limtiaco, 537 E App'x 721, 722 (9th Cir.
2013) (per curiam) (First Amendment right to take photos of police).
11. See Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding no clearly established
right to record traffic stops and expressing doubt as to whether right exists at all given dangerousness
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there is not yet a "clearly established" First Amendment right to record police
activity in public, 12 a finding that results in qualified immunity for police
officers accused of violating the right. 13 Judges who sit in the same courthouses
are coming to different conclusions, within weeks of each other, about whether
the right is clearly established. 14 Since the gathering of the symposium in
October 2015, one district court has even taken the unprecedented step of
holding that there is no First Amendment right to record the police at all. 15 And
when courts have explicitly found a right to record, they have varied widely in
defining its limits. 
16
It is more likely than not that we are heading toward a national recognition of
a First Amendment right to record on-duty police officers in public. 17 The real
challenge for courts will not be whether there is a First Amendment right to
record the police, but rather where its limits lie. For despite a common under-
standing that there is constitutional freedom to record the police in public, there
has been strong resistance to civilian recording of police officers from police
departments around the country, based in large part on accusations that civilian
presented by traffic stops); cf Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 611 (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that there should
be no First Amendment right to record the police in public).
12. See Lawson v. Hilderbrand, 88 F. Supp. 3d 84, 100 (D. Conn. 2015); Garcia v. Montgomery
County, No. TDC-12-3592, 2015 WL 6773715, at *7 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2015); Pluma v. City of New
York, No. 13CIV.2017(LAP), 2015 WL 1623828, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015); Montgomery v.
Killingsworth, No. 13CV256, 2015 WL 289934, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2015); Williams v. Boggs, No.
6:13-65-DCR, 2014 WL 585373, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2014); Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 3 F.
Supp. 3d 1002, 1074 (D.N.M. 2014), aff'd on other grounds, No. 14-2063, 2015 WL 9298662, at
*11-12 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2015); Ortiz v. City of New York No. 11CIV.7919(JMF), 2013 WL
5339156, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013); see also True Blue Auctions v. Foster, 528 F. App'x 190, 193
(3d Cir. 2013) (no clearly established right to record police on a public sidewalk); Szymecki v. Houck,
353 F. App'x 852, 853 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (same).
13. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (holding that the doctrine of qualified
immunity protects police officers from liability if their conduct does not violate clearly established
rights that a reasonable person would have known).
14. Compare Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d 369, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding
clearly established right for a non-participant in a police encounter to film the police), with Pluma, 2015
WL 1623828, at *7 (noting there is no clearly established right to record police activity), and Ortiz,
2013 WL 5339156, at *4 (same).
15. See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20840, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 19, 2016) (holding there is no First Amendment right "based solely on 'observing and recording'
without expressive conduct"). This case is currently on appeal before the Third Circuit. See ACLU-PA
Appeals Judge's Ruling Against First Amendment Right to Record Police, ACLU OF PA. (Mar. 21,
2016), http://www.aclupa.org/news/2016/03/21/aclu-pa-appeals-judges-ruling-against-first-amendment-
right [https://perma.cc/QA72-W55P].
16. Compare Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014) (stating that filming police can only be
constitutionally prohibited after a lawful order from a police officer when filming has interfered with
police work), with Higginbotham, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (holding that the right to record the police was
clearly established as to journalists that are filming at a distance and "unconnected to the events
recorded").
17. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds & John A. Steakley, A Due Process Right to Record the Police, 89
WASH. U. L. REv. 1203, 1204 (2013) ("Though the issue has not yet reached the Supreme Court, it
seems safe to say that the case for First Amendment protection regarding photos and video of law
enforcement officers in public is quite strong, and is in the process of being resolved.").
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filming "interfere [s]" with police work,18 places officers in danger,1 9 or makes
officers hesitant to engage in meaningful police work for fear of being filmed.20
This resistance sometimes happens formally, for example, when police leaders
have asked legislatures to criminalize the act of recording when the recording is
done physically close to officers. 1 One bill proposed in the Texas legislature in
March 2015, for instance, would have criminalized "filming, recording, photo-
graphing, or documenting the officer within 25 feet" while that officer is
performing his official duties.22 Resistance by police officers to civilian filming
also happens on an ad hoc basis, ranging from ubiquitous requests that bystand-
ers stop filming to arrests of individuals for interfering with police work through
filming or failing to obey a command to stop recording.23 To be sure, an
individual filming a police officer may actually be physically interfering with
that officer's ability to do her job. The First Amendment challenge in the
context of police resistance to being filmed, then, is figuring out where constitu-
tionally protected activity ends and interference begins.
This Article lays out and defends a robust First Amendment right to record
the police up to the point that the act of filming presents a concrete, physical
impediment to a police officer or to public safety. To figure out when the
expressive activity of recording a police officer is worthy of constitutional
protection, we need to know why that expression is valuable. I begin, in Part I,
by contrasting civilian filming of the police with the use of police-worn body
cameras-an accountability mechanism that has received broad national support
18. See Robinson Meyer, What to Say When the Police Tell You to Stop Filming Them, THE ATLANTIC
(Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/what-to-say-when-the-police-
tellyou-to-stop-filming-them/391610/ [perma.cc/7WKM-JHD9].
19. See, e.g., Anthony DeStefano, NYPD Commissioner Bratton: Interfering with Arrests Makes it
Harder for Cops to Nab Suspects, NEWSDAY (July 28, 2014), http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/
nypd-commissioner-bratton-interfering-with-arrests-makes-it-harder-for-cops-to-nab-suspects-1.8910655
[perma.cc/C6F8-JQWF] (quoting NYPD Commissioner William Bratton as stating that civilian filming
of officers interferes with their duties and puts officer safety in jeopardy).
20. See Comey, supra note 6.
21. See, e.g., Matt Stout, Boston Police Commissioner Wants Law to Push Back on Camera-Toting
Cop Watchers, Bos. HERALD (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.bostonherald.com/news opinion/local coverage/
2015/08/boston police commissioner wants law to push back on camera [https://perma.cc/YCJ4-
CDU] (describing call from Boston Police Commissioner William B. Evans for a law restricting the
ability of citizens to film the police in public).
22. H.B. 2918, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
23. According to one expert, Jay Stanley of the ACLU, "[t]here is a widespread, continuing pattern
of law enforcement officers ordering people to stop taking photographs or video in public places and
harassing, detaining and arresting those who fail to comply." Sam Adler-Bell, That's What You Get for
Filming the Police, TRUTHOUT (May 7, 2015), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/30628-that-s-what-you-
get-for-filming-the-police [https://perma.cc/F59F-Y2TG]; see also Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image
Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REv.
335, 357-64 (2011) (collecting cases); Daniel Denvir, The Legal Right to Videotape Police Isn't
Actually All That Clear, CITYLAB (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/crime/2015/04/the-legal-right-
to-videotape-police-isnt-actually-all-that-clear/390285/ [perma.cc/9YCC-76BJ].
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in the last two years. 24 I begin with this comparison for two reasons-first,
because the national consensus that body cameras are an important tool of
police accountability risks obscuring the importance of civilian recording of the
police; and, second, because the contrast between the two forms of filming
the police brings out benefits of civilian recording that go beyond the recording
itself. When civilians film the police, local residents become the ones ensuring
police accountability, resulting in a palpable power shift. Local residents remain
in control of the footage and the information. And they are able to shape and
define the public spaces that they occupy-filming becomes both a form of
participation in public life and an expression of dissent.
Part II shifts to First Amendment theory, spelling out the First Amendment
values behind the right to record the police. Some courts have begun to
articulate these values. But when courts have done so, they emphasize one set of
First Amendment values-the contribution of videos to public discourse and
self-government-and discount the equally important value of promoting the
ability of civilians to challenge government authority and contest government
practices-to dissent. A jurisprudence of the right to record should account for
both the benefits to public discourse and the in-the-moment communication to
officers that can be found when civilians record the police. By recognizing the
multifaceted constitutional values entailed in the right to record the police, the
constitutional importance of the First Amendment right becomes more concrete
and its protections broader.
Part III parses through the limits of a robust First Amendment right to record
the police in public, identifying the boundary between protected filming of the
police and unprotected interference with police work. I contend that two central
tenets must guide determinations of when recording the police is constitution-
ally protected conduct: first, the act of recording on its own can never be enough
to constitute interference; and second, any prohibited conduct must constitute
physical interference with, or obstruction of, police work. These guidelines
allow civilians not only to capture police conduct on camera, but also to express
to officers in the moment-close-up and angrily, if they so choose-that they
are watching them, that they own their block.
I. BEYOND BODY CAMERAS
We live in a world where civilian videos of police officers are ubiquitous.
Indeed, a number of films recorded by civilians-of the choking of Eric Garner,
24. See generally Bipartisan Support for More Body Cameras on Police Officers, PEW RES. CTR.
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/08/sharp-racial-divisions-in-reactions-to-brown-
garner-decisions/bipartisan/ [https://perma.cc/3ZZW-JMK5] (providing data showing broad support
across racial and political lines for increasing the number of police-worn body cameras); Clare
Sestanovich, Our Body-Cams, Ourselves, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.
themarshallproject.org/2015/02/10/our-body-cams-ourselves [perma.cc/3M6A-3VS3] (describing "broad
(and rare) consensus ... in support of [body-cameras among] advocates, legislators, and even many
officers themselves").
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the shooting of Walter Scott, the beating of a teenager at a public pool in
McKinney, Texas-have become national artifacts revealing to the world police
conduct that otherwise would have remained unknown.25 Videos, once made
public, have given authority to experiences of people of color with respect to
the police, and have inserted into privileged lives the realities of those lived
experiences. They have also changed the nature of formal proceedings to deal
with complaints of police violence-as videos of police actions in public have
proliferated, official findings of police misconduct and false statements by
courts and police review boards have increased as well.26 And the public, in
turn, has shifted its view of policing; national polls reveal that between Decem-
ber 2014 and May 2015 white Americans came to believe in larger numbers
than ever that reports of police violence against African-Americans are not
isolated incidents and that there is a broader problem in American policing.27
Despite the growing importance of civilian video, however, recent calls to
protect civilian filming have for the most part taken a back seat to calls for
another form of filming the police: body cameras worn and operated by police
officers themselves. 28 Since mid-2014, at least thirty-six states have proposed
some form of legislation involving police-worn cameras, and President Obama
has announced a three-year, $263 million investment in body cameras. 29 To be
sure, body cameras are an important tool of deterrence and documentation;
when used correctly they can aid law enforcement in their investigations and
ensure reliable footage of use of force by the police.30 But accompanying the
25. See generally Perez-Pena & Williams, supra note 8 (discussing each of these videos).
26. See, e.g., NYC CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, at vii (2015), http://www.
nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/2015 -Semi-Annual-Report-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/B82P-PP6N]
(stating that the review board has increased the rate at which it substantiates claims of misconduct "due,
at least in some part, to the increasing availability of video").
27. See Mark Berman, White Americans Are Changing Their Minds About Recent Deaths at the
Hands of Police, WASH. POST (May 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/
2015/05/08/the-very-different-way-white-and-black-americans-view-recent-deaths-at-the-hands-of-
police-officers/ [https://perma.cc/R3EK-KX2D] (describing a May 2015 survey "show[ing] that 45
percent of white Americans said the deaths [of unarmed blacks] were isolated, down from 60 percent in
The Post's poll last December; the number of white Americans who say there is a broader problem in
policing has moved to 43 percent from 35 percent over the same span"); Perez-Pena & Williams, supra
note 8 (attributing this change to the "glare of video").
28. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REv. 831,
832-33 (2014) (describing the widespread support for police-worn body cameras expressed in 2014 by
scholars, public officials, journalists, activists, and police departments); Sestanovich, supra note 24.
29. See Brian Heaton, Body-Worn Camera Legislation Spikes in State Legislatures, Gov. TECH. (June
1, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/dc/Body-Worn-Camera-Legislation-Spikes-in-State-Legislatures.
html [perma.cc/F6VB-Y7AG]; Reid Wilson, Police Accountability Measures Flood State Legislatures
After Fergusion, Staten Island, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/
wp/2015/02/04/police-accountability-measures-flood- state-legislatures-after- ferguson- staten-island! [per-
ma.cc/T2QU-64EJ]. However, most major American cities still do not have body cameras on their
officers. See Dana Liebelson & Nick Wing, Most Major Cities Still Don't Have Body Cameras for
Cops, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-body-cameras
55cbaac7e4b0flcbfle740f9?kv [perma.cc/7BT5 -RYHR].
30. See, e.g., Rory Carroll, California Police Use of Body Cameras Cuts Violence and Complaints,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/04/california-police-body-
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rise of police-worn body cameras is a misguided sense that the presence of body
cameras negates the benefits of civilian recording.31 Civilian recording is
different in kind than the recording captured by police-worn cameras. This Part,
therefore, contrasts the two forms of filming the police-filming by civilians in
public and filming through police-worn body cameras-in order to flesh out the
independent importance of civilian recordings and connect that importance to
First Amendment protections.
To change who holds the camera, records the footage, and controls access to
the footage is to change both the nature and the results of the act of filming an
on-duty police officer. To begin with, the perspective literally matters: people
perceive videos differently based on the angle from which they are shot and
who has done the shooting. 32 With videotaped interrogations, for instance,
individuals viewing a video of a confession are more likely to believe the police
are being coercive if the video is shot from the point of view of the person being
interrogated, pointing at a police officer. When the video is pointed at the
suspect, in contrast, viewers are more likely to judge the confession voluntary.3 3
Something similar occurs with videos of police conduct: when shot from the
point of view of the police officer, as a body camera will do, the "camera
perspective bias" will cause the viewer to sympathize with the officer's actions
more than they would with a video taken from a neutral angle or from the
perspective of the person engaging with the police officer.34 To be sure, a video
recorded by a civilian observer may have its own "camera perspective bias,"
making the viewer sympathize less with police officers and more with civilians
interacting with those officers. But to add a civilian perspective to the existing
footage from a body camera is to enhance the viewer's ability to think through a
situation from different viewpoints.
cameras-cuts-violence-complaints-rialto [https://perma.cc/F4DE-9Z2F]; INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF PO-
LICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN POLICING: RESEARCH AND BEST PRACTICES FROM THE
IACP STUDY ON IN-CAR CAMERAS 2 (2004), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/ric/ResourceDetail.aspx?RID-
404 [https://perma.cc/XJ4W-FM2X].
31. For example, a number of police leaders have both criticized civilian filming and announced new
initiatives to equip officers with body cameras. See, e.g., DeStefano, supra note 19; Stout, supra note
21.
32. See Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333, 1347460
(2010) (discussing the social science of camera perspective bias and its impact on video evidence in
court).
33. See G. Daniel Lassiter & Audrey A. Irvine, Videotaped Confessions: The Impact of Camera
Point of View on Judgments of Coercion, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 268, 268 (1986) (discussed in
Benforado, supra note 32, at 1350).
34. See Benforado, supra note 32, at 1353-56 (discussing perspective bias in the context of the
video in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)).
35. This camera perspective bias, though, is less clear than that of a police-worn camera. If a third
party observer takes a video from a neutral distance, studies show that their assessment of the situation
will be somewhere in the middle between the perspective of either of the two actors interacting with
one another. See Lassiter & Irvine, supra note 33, at 268 (finding that a third-party perspective of a
confession will lead to an intermediate assessment of whether a confession was coerced).
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Civilian control over the recording device itself is also critical to the capture
of the video. When civilians are operating the smartphone or the camera, police
officers cannot turn off the camera 36 or "forget" to turn it on when they do not
want to be filmed. 37 Such interference with body-worn cameras may be common-
place in some police departments. In 2014, for example, a U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) report alleging excessive force at the Albuquerque Police Depart-
ment found that police officers were inconsistent in turning on their cameras,
often failed to record incidents even when they initiated the contact, and then
gave what the DOJ concluded were unconvincing explanations as to why they
did not turn on their cameras.38 Similarly, in New Orleans, a report on the use of
lapel cameras found that in two-thirds of cases, police officers did not activate
their cameras during "use of force" events.39 Civilian recorders of police
officers do not film all instances of use of force, either-often, they are not there
at all. Nor do civilians make neutral decisions about what conduct is worthy of
recording. But when a civilian records a police officer, it transfers the decision
of when to press "record" away from the officer and into the hands of an outside
spectator.
Similarly, civilian control over access to the footage changes the function of
the video in the public sphere. When police departments become their own
gatekeepers, deciding what to release, when, and to whom, they remain in
control of the narrative surrounding videos-solidifying, rather than disman-
tling, the traditional monopoly that police departments possess over the evi-
dence of and narratives structuring their behavior on the street.4 ° In many states,
police departments are the sole gatekeepers of the release of body camera
footage. Police departments often require complicated discovery requests before
the footage is released or refuse to turn over any footage at all.4 1 State
36. Or, at least they cannot turn it off without seizing the property or the person.
37. See, e.g., Robert Gammon, OPD Needs to Start Using Its Lapel Cameras, E. BAY EXPRESS
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/opd-needs-to-start-using-its-lapel-cameras/
Content?oid-3756595 [http://perma.cc/NX5Z-NFT7]. In Los Angeles, one internal inspection found
that about half of the estimated eighty cars in one patrol division had cameras or microphones that had
been tampered with or removed by officers. See Joel Rubin, LAPD Officers Tampered with In-car
Recording Equipment, Records Show, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/apr/07/
local/la-me-lapd-tamper-20140408 [http://perma.cc/MYE3 -EPVX].
38. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE Civ. RIGHTS Div., ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT (2014), http://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/04/10/apd findings 4-10-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R54-
M4EP].
39. See Ken Daley, Cameras Not On Most of the Time When NOPD Uses Force, Monitor Finds,
NOLA (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2014/09/cameras not on most of the tim.
html [https://perma.cc/DA6Y-GCVL].
40. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 18
(1966) (describing police officers' control over the structures surrounding their actions); Jocelyn
Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REv. 391, 417-18 (2016) (describing how police officers have
long controlled official narratives of officers' behavior).
41. See, e.g., Sara Libby, Even When Police Do Wear Body Cameras, Don't Count on Seeing the
Footage, CITY LAB (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/crime/2014/08/even-when-police-do-wear-
cameras-you-cant-count-on-ever-seeing-the-footage/378690/ [https://perma.cc/K683-PC3H]; Sestanov-
2016] 1567
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
legislatures around the country are moving to restrict access to body camera
footage by exempting it from public records laws.4 2 By maintaining control
over their body camera operation and footage, police departments are able to
craft official narratives before handing over information to the public or to
independent investigators. In August 2015, for example, the Oakland Police
Department held an invitation-only screening of a video of a fatal incident, but
refused to release that same video to the public or provide a full, unedited
version.43 And the Chicago Police Department famously resisted releasing the
footage of the police shooting of civilian Laquan McDonald, doing so only after
losing a court battle in November 2015 and then carefully orchestrating the
release of the video.4 4 When police departments control access to the footage
and the narratives surrounding any release of the footage, they strengthen their
own power over the people who interact with the police on those videos.
In contrast, when civilians film the police, local residents hold the police
accountable, resulting in a palpable power shift. Civilians record footage from
their own perspective and control the release of that footage to the public or the
authorities. They also do more than that: they communicate to police officers in
the moment that someone is watching them. The transfer of power inherent in
the act of observation turns the filming of a police officer in public into a form
of resistance-into a challenge to their authority. Indeed, filming by disempow-
ered populations has its own term and meaning in social theory: sousveillance is
a special term for when cameras are turned on those in power.45 Sousveillance
being watched from below, rather than from on high-facilitates the transfer of
power from authorities to the less powerful.46 Many civilians recognize the
importance of this power shift. Organized copwatching groups, for example,
ich, supra note 24 ("The urgent question now is not who will use the cameras, but who will be allowed
to see the footage.").
42. See Ryan J. Foley, Bills Nationwide Aim to Seal Police Body Camera Videos, DES MOINES REG.
(Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-and-courts/2015/03/21/body-
cameras-access-nationwide/25108067/ [https://perma.cc/K392-CQV2].
43. See Darwin BondGraham, Oakland Police Let Media Watch Body-Cam Footage of Fatal
Incidents, But Refuse to Publicly Release Videos, E. BAY EXPRESS (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.
eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2015/08/19/oakland-police-let-media-watch-body-cam- footage-
of- fatal-incidents-but-refuse-to-publicly-release-videos [https://perma.cc/3UDQ-FCDE].
44. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Cover-Up in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/11/30/opinion/cover-up-in-chicago.html [https://perma.cc/NLC2-ASY6].
45. Professor Steven Mann, who coined the term, describes sousveillance as a technique for
"uncovering the panopticon and undercutting its primary purpose and privilege." Steve Mann et al.,
Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance
Environments, 1 SURVEILLANCE & Soc. 331, 333 (2003); see also Steve Mann & Joseph Ferenbok, New
Media and the Power Politics of Sousveillance in a Surveillance-Dominated World, 11 SURVEILLANCE &
Soc. 18, 26 (2013) ("The practice of viewing from below when coupled with political action becomes a
balancing force that helps-in democratic societies-move the overall 'state' towards a kind of
veillance (monitoring) equilibrium .. "); Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First
Amendment and Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REv. 1, 66-67 (2007) (describing how sousveil-
lance can be an empowering activity in the context of public protests).
46. For an extended discussion of this phenomenon, see Simonson, supra note 40.
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have proliferated around the United States, in part because they link the power
transfer involved in filming the police to efforts at larger social change.4 7 One
organized copwatching group describes its main purpose as "organiz[ing] and
empower[ing] community residents to work collectively to change the relation-
ships of power that affect our community., 48 In this way, filming police in
public can become a form of civic engagement, a public gesture in which a
civilian says through the pointing of a cell phone at an officer that they are
holding that officer accountable in the moment.
The most open-sourced police-worn body cameras in the world could not
substitute for the expressive functions of filming the police in public. So that to
protect civilian recording is not just to say that we need to protect the documen-
tation of police conduct should disputes arise in the future over the content of
that conduct. It is also to say that we should protect the contestation of local
police practices through observation and dissent. Part of allowing residents to
participate in the public life of their neighborhoods means allowing them to
shape and define the public spaces that they occupy through the expressive
activity of filming the police at work.4 9 The question is not, then, whether
civilian video is valuable-it is-but how and why civilian video is constitution-
ally valuable. In the next Part, I connect the values of civilian recording of the
police-democratic engagement, police accountability, and the expression of
dissent-to parallel values found in First Amendment jurisprudence.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND CIVILIAN RECORDING
Police officers resist civilian recording in public when the act of recording
disrupts their police work or undermines their authority. But disruptive, annoy-
ing, and offensive speech may be protected from government interference by
the First Amendment when that protection serves larger First Amendment
values, most famously the central tenets of promoting truth, self-government,
and personal autonomy.50 These values help identify which expressive acts are
protected by the First Amendment and under what circumstances. Courts that
recognize a right to record have relied almost exclusively on one First Amend-
ment value: promoting self-government through the free discussion of govern-
mental affairs. 51 This leading account of the First Amendment values behind the
right to record is correct but incomplete, for it sets aside the ways in which
the act of filming an officer in the open is a form of autonomous expression in
the moment-an expression that would lose its full meaning if the expresser
47. Id.
48. Id. at413-14.
49. Cf TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC
PLACES 7-8 (2009) (describing the participatory benefits of allowing individuals to define their own
spaces through speech out of doors).
50. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 3-14 (1982).
51. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 E3d 583, 596-97 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655
F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011).
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were not also visibly holding a recording device. So that for a complete account
of the value to society behind the conduct that the First Amendment seeks to
protect, a jurisprudence of the right to record should account for both the
benefits to public discourse and the in-the-moment communication to officers
that can be found when civilians record the police.
This Article assumes for the moment-although I return to it later-the
baseline concept that video or audio recording of police officers in public is
protected activity under the First Amendment. Many federal courts to address
the matter have assumed this to be true, some without much discussion at all
about if or how filming is a form of speech. 2 Although there is some disagree-
ment among academics about whether recording is itself a form of expression,
there is a general consensus that to record an official in public implicates the
First Amendment because it is either expressive conduct itself or conduct that is
essentially preparatory to speech-akin to gathering news or spending money to
support a political candidate. 3 Setting aside this debate for a moment, I turn to
focus instead on the First Amendment values underlying the protection of
filming the police in public.
According to the leading cases finding a right to record-most prominently,
recent decisions by the Seventh Circuit in Alvarez and the First Circuit in
Glik-the central value served by recording police officials in public is the
potential of the captured video to contribute to public discourse, and especially
to the public discussion of issues related to politics and government.5 4 As the
First Circuit put it: "Gathering information about government officials in a form
that can readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First Amendment
interest in protecting and promoting 'the free discussion of governmental
affairs.' 5 5 Both the First and Seventh Circuits also rely on the related idea,
drawn from campaign finance cases, that the First Amendment "prohibit[s]
government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the
52. See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596-97; Glik, 655 F.3d at 83-84; Smith v. City of Cumming, 212
F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
Adkins v. Limtiaco, 537 F. App'x 721, 722 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (discussing First Amendment
right to take photos of police). But see Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. 14-4424, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20840, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2016) (finding that recording the police on its own is not activity
protected by the First Amendment).
53. For thorough discussions of this issue, see Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REv. 57,
84-85 (2014) (arguing that data collection is speech and, in particular, that filming is a type of
expressive conduct); Kreimer, supra note 23, at 385 ("A prohibition on image capture is effectively a
prohibition on the practice of sharing spontaneous images from life."); Margot Kaminski, Privacy and
the Right to Record, 96 B. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2016); Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech
and Democracy in the Video Age, 116 COLUM. L. REv. 991 (2016). For an argument that recording is not
itself a form of speech, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1042
(2015) ("The act of recording is not itself expressive in the way that burning a flag is expressive
because it does not communicate a message; it creates a message to be communicated later.").
54. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 597; Glik, 655 F.3d at 83.
55. Glik, 655 E3d at 82 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
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public may draw.",5 6 Just as limiting the flow of money to political candidates or
causes can restrict the amount of information that people have at their disposal
when making political decisions, limiting the capture of audio and video of
police conduct restricts the public's repository of information from which to
draw when discussing and evaluating police practices. 5 7 Protecting the record-
ing of the police thus enhances the key First Amendment value of promoting
democratic discussion and engagement.5 8
Although courts are right to identify the contributions of recording the police
to public discourse and to self-government, that should not be the end of the
story. To be sure, because the police have traditionally been the ones with
control over official narratives about police conduct in court and in the news,
the ability to counter those narratives with stories backed up by video has
transformed the nature of both public opinion and court testimony 759 But the
comparisons to campaign finance and the gathering of news miss out on the
connection of open recording of the police to First Amendment values related to
the ability of civilians to challenge government authority in the moment-to
contest, resist, and dissent from local government practices through the expres-
sive act of holding a visible recording device.60 Recognizing the contemporane-
ous power of such an act implicates a range of First Amendment values-self-
government, yes, but also promoting dissent,61 and protecting autonomy and
"individual self-realization." 62 While a focus on discourse and self-government
56. Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)); see also Alvarez, 679 F.3d at
596 (money spent on politics "necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached" (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976))).
57. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596.
58. See generally Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 600 (stating that speech and press liberty are meant "to secure
the[] right to a free discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any
time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion by any just
criticism upon their conduct .. " (emphasis in original) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 421-22 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1868))); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 93-94 (1980) ("The expression-related provisions of the First Amend-
ment... were certainly intended to help make our governmental processes work, to ensure open and
informed discussion of political issues, and to check our government when it gets out of bounds.");
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 119 (1965)
("[T]he First Amendment ... is concerned with the authority of the hearers to meet together, to discuss,
and to hear discussed by speakers of their own choice, whatever they may deem worthy of their
consideration.").
59. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text; see also Kreimer, supra note 23, at 385 ("Image
capture is a precondition for effective participation in the contemporary visual ecology of communica-
tion."); Marceau & Chen, supra note 53, at 16 (describing the "unique contributions of recording to
enhancing truth and promoting public discourse").
60. See generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 527-42 (1977) (describing the purpose of free speech as preserving the "checking value" of
ordinary citizens against government overreaching).
61. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 93 (1999) (arguing
that a central value of the First Amendment is to promote dissent).
62. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593 (1982); see also David
A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123
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alone has generated only a forward-looking analysis (how can this act of
recording affect public discourse or the workings of government in the fu-
ture?),63 a focus that also incorporates dissent, autonomy, and self-realization
would investigate the presence of contemporaneous communication (how is this
act of recording communicating a "proposition or attitude" towards a public
official at the time of the recording?). 64 Asking this second, multifaceted
question reveals the ways in which holding up a recording device in the visible
presence of an officer communicates something important in the moment to that
officer and to the larger public.
Observation of governmental actors can be a form of in-the-moment expres-
sion itself. When people observe government officials in action, the observers
impact the decision making of those officials and help shape the public mean-
ings of those official acts. And recording backs up the power of observation
indeed, for some traditionally disempowered populations, the activity of close
observation would not be safe or possible without the "weapon" of the camera
to provide safety.6 6 First Amendment jurisprudence has recognized this in-the-
moment function of observation in the context of the right to observe courtroom
proceedings. There, the Supreme Court has found the value of an open court-
room in the ability of the observer not just to publicize their observations in the
future, but also to hold public officials accountable through observation in the
moment. As the Court has said, "[t]he value of openness lies in the fact that
people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of
U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974) (describing First Amendment value of "autonomous self-determination");
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 221 (1972) (discussing
personal autonomy as the central value protected by the First Amendment). Note that Redish's
conception of "individual self-realization" encompasses the values of both autonomy and self-
government, among others. See Redish, supra, at 594.
63. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing the benefits of
recording the police as uncovering abuse, disseminating information to the public, and improving the
functioning of government).
64. See Scanlon, supra note 62, at 206 ("[By] 'acts of expression,' ... I mean to include any act that
is intended by its agent to communicate to one or more persons some proposition or attitude."). This is
echoed in Supreme Court jurisprudence, which holds that to constitute protected expression, there must
be "intent to convey a particularized message ... and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood
[i]s great that the message w[ill] be understood by those who view[] it." Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
65. See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS
IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 302 (2011) (describing one of the central purposes of
observers in adjudication as "denying the government and disputants unchecked authority to determine
the social meanings of conflicts and their resolutions"). The idea that observers have an effect on
individuals' actions simply through observation-sometimes referred to as the observer effect or the
Hawthorne effect-is born out in social psychology as well. See generally PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & ANN
L. WEBER, PSYCHOLOGY 445 (1994) (discussing studies that measure the effects of observers on an
individual performing a task).
66. See Kyle VanHemert, Are Cameras the New Guns?, GIZMODO (June 2, 2010, 5:00 PM),
http://gizmodo.com/5553765/are-cameras-the-new-guns [https://perma.cc/XYR7-TC2R] ("When the po-
lice act as though cameras were the equivalent of guns pointed at them, there is a sense in which they
are correct. Cameras have become the most effective weapon that ordinary people have to protect
against and to expose police abuse.").
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fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend
gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that devia-
tions will become known. 6 7 The physical presence of citizen observers matters
just as much as the later contributions of those observers to public discourse.
Moreover, by visibly challenging authority, the action of filming police
officers in public is an expression of dissent. Pointing a smartphone at a police
officer in public is a statement to that officer; it can serve as a symbol of quiet
defiance. This visible challenge feels disruptive to police officers: they report
that they feel tense 68 and threatened69 by the presence of civilian recorders. The
fact that the act of visible recording feels disruptive to police officers, even from
afar, supports its inclusion as the kind of speech that must be protected precisely
because it "invite[s] dispute" and causes "public inconvenience" and "unrest. ',70
It is in this respect that filming in public is different from observing a public
trial: while courtrooms demand decorum and solemnity, the public street is a
forum traditionally open to dissent by the public, especially in the presence of
armed police officers.7 1
A closer analog in First Amendment jurisprudence than the right to a public
trial is the right to curse at police officers in public. The Supreme Court
articulated this right most fully in City of Houston v. Hill, in which the Court
found a Texas statute overbroad when that statute made it a crime to "oppose,
molest, abuse or interrupt a police officer in the execution of his duty.",72 As the
Court stated: "The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge
police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics
by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.",73 The Court made
clear that police officers must have a higher tolerance than a member of the
general public for words that are challenging or provocative, for "a properly
trained officer may reasonably be expected to 'exercise a higher degree of
restraint' than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belliger-
ently to 'fighting words.' '74 Significantly, in Hill, this led the Court to draw the
constitutional line between protected and unprotected conduct at physical inter-
ference or obstruction.75 The constitutional value served by protecting this
67. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); see also Jocelyn
Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REv. 2173, 2197-200
(2014) (discussing the First Amendment values behind the Supreme Court's public trial cases).
68. See DeStefano, supra note 19.
69. See Davis, supra note 6.
70. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (emphasis added). In Terminiello, the Court
continued: "[Free speech] may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Id.
71. See generally ZICK, supra note 49, at 7-8 (describing public spaces as traditional cites of dissent
and discussing the tendency of public officials to favor order and decorum over the expression of
dissent).
72. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,461 (1987).
73. Id. at 462-63.
74. Id. at 462 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
75. See id. at462 n.il.
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conduct is not reasoned deliberation about government affairs, but rather the
peaceful opposition to the authority of state actors.76
Like loud cursing, open recording is irritating to police officers, who may feel
inhibited or distracted by the presence of the recorder. But, like cursing, the
protection of open recording is supported by First Amendment values in part
because it is a provocative form of expression-it allows civilians to challenge
government authority on their own terms. Professor Timothy Zick, in his
theorizing of First Amendment rights in public places, argues that sometimes
protecting democratic values requires that we allow dissenters not just into
social space, but also into the personal and even intimate space of public
officials-what Zick terms "embodied places.",77 First Amendment protection of
speech within embodied places facilitates forms of individual expression whose
power is derived precisely from the proximity and immediacy of the act. 78 This
is often true of the recording of police officers: while filming at a distance may
sufficiently capture video for future use, it is the visible, in-your-face nature of
holding up a cell phone in the immediate proximity of an officer at work that
can solidify an individual statement of dissent and contestation.
The First Amendment values of self-government, self-realization, and protect-
ing dissent thus combine to protect the ability of civilians to challenge authority
in the moment and in person.79 If we resolve to abide by these values, the clear
implication is that to record a police officer is a protected form of expression in
itself-not just because it is preparatory to the eventual speech involved in
disseminating a video, but also because it expresses a "particularized message"
in the moment.80 The First Amendment must allow civilians to intrude into the
sphere of police work with their cameras and smartphones up until the point that
they physically interfere with that work. Our constitutional jurisprudence can
only reach this conclusion if it recognizes that the constitutional purpose of
protecting civilian recording is not just to protect the videos and audio captured
by that recording, but also to protect the expressive act of recording itself.
III. "INTERFERENCE" AND THE LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO RECORD
Where, then, do the constitutional limits of the right to record lie? Police
officers and legislators may have very good reasons for wanting to restrict the
76. See id. at 463 n.12 ("[T]he strongest case for allowing challenge [to the police] is simply the
imponderable risk of abuse-to what extent realized it would never be possible to ascertain-that lies
in the state in which no challenge is allowed." (quoting Note, Types of Activity Encompassed by the
Offense of Obstructing a Public Officer, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 388, 407 (1960))).
77. ZICK, supra note 49, at 65-67.
78. Id. at 71. Zick invokes the idea of "embodied places" to explain that intrusion into someone's
personal "buffer zone" is essential to certain forms of expression. Id. at 71-74.
79. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 61, at 76-80 (arguing that the protection of dissent implicates the First
Amendment values of self-government, autonomy, and political identity).
80. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). I would therefore disagree with, or expand
upon, the contention of previous scholars who have situated the right to record within its value as
conduct essentially preparatory to speech. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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act of filming, most centrally an interest in promoting public and officer safety.
But in drawing the boundaries of the right to record, courts must keep in mind
the multifaceted values underlying the right. Because the right to record values
both the contributions of recording to future public discourse and the in-the-
moment communication of visibly recording an officer, reasonable restrictions
on the right cannot interfere too much with the ability of civilians either to
capture footage for future use in the public sphere or to express dissent through
the act of recording.
For the most part, courts have not adequately separated out these constitu-
tional concerns when assessing the right to record. As a result, their rulings on
the limits of the right have been wildly inconsistent. One recent district court
decision, for instance, goes to great pains to limit First Amendment protection
for recording officers to journalists who are unaffiliated with any of the people
interacting with the police and who remain at a significant distance from the
police they are filming.81 The First Circuit, in contrast, has stated that recording
of the police by anyone8 2 can only be constitutionally prohibited when that
person has interfered with police work through physical contact and when they
have refused to stop their recording after a lawful warning.8 3 A court assessing
the constitutionality of a restriction on recording police officer conduct in public
should be required to assess whether the restriction unnecessarily interferes with
either the contemporaneous or future benefits of protecting the expressive
conduct of recording. The right should not just be about silent filming from a
distance, although that is often a good strategy for filming, but also about
filming that involves disruptive and provocative behavior. Such demonstrative
recording is invariably "irritating" to police officers, 84 but is nevertheless
constitutionally protected.
Recognizing the contemporaneous expressive power of the act of recording
police officers leads to a number of important doctrinal conclusions. First, it
demonstrates that many restrictions of the ability of civilians to record officers
are content-based restrictions, making them subject to strict scrutiny.8 5 The
content of the message of a bystander who is visibly pointing a recording device
in the direction of the police is different than a bystander who has their hands at
their sides. The recording bystander is telling the officer: I am watching you,
and I care about how you speak and act when you are on duty. The camera is
81. Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d 369, 379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
82. See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) ("[T]he news-gathering protections of the
First Amendment cannot turn on professional credentials or status.").
83. Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014).
84. Stout, supra note 21 (video interview with Commissioner Evans of Boston describing irritation
of being filmed by civilians when on duty).
85. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (describing how
content-based restrictions must pass strict scrutiny such that the restriction must be the least restrictive
means of achieving a compelling state interest); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) ("Our cases
indicate that ... a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum ... must be subjected
to the most exacting scrutiny." (emphasis in original)).
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part of the content of the speech.8 6 So that when a legislature bans recording
within a certain distance of a police officer on duty or when a police officer
arrests someone solely because of the presence of a recording device, those
actions are being taken based in part on the expressive content of visibly
holding the recording device.8 7 Indeed, in Texas, the state representative sponsor-
ing the bill that would ban nonreporters from filming within twenty-five feet of
an officer repeatedly emphasized that the bill's intention was not to inhibit
filming or police accountability (the future results of recording police officers),
but rather to prevent interference with police work (the in-the-moment results of
holding up a recording device near an officer).88 If you do not recognize the
value of protecting the contemporaneous expression of recording a police
officer, however, it is not obvious that these restrictions are content-based.89
One implication of the content-based nature of restrictions on recording is
that the act of recording a police officer in public can never on its own
constitute interference or a crime. This should be the first tenet of any jurispru-
dence of the right to record. However, this is not currently the state of the law in
many places. A woman in Pittsburgh, for example, was recently convicted after
a bench trial of police interference for filming police officers from fifty feet
away and refusing to obey six orders to turn off her phone and leave the area. 90
Although police officers require discretion in deciding when and how to investi-
gate cases or secure crime scenes, such a conviction cannot pass constitutional
muster-recording officers from fifty-feet away in public must be constitution-
ally protected conduct. And an arrest for failing to obey an unconstitutional
command cannot stand. Similarly, a statute that criminalizes the recording of a
police officer within a certain distance-for instance, twenty-five feet, as the
proposed bill in Texas would have done91 -is unconstitutional because it
criminalizes the expressive conduct of holding up a phone within a visible
distance of an officer.
86. Cf Kaminski, supra note 53 (arguing that "recording... does not communicate a message that
is readily separable from the regulable aspects of the act.").
87. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 319 (finding a law prohibiting certain signs content-based because "the
government has determined that an entire category of speech-signs or displays critical of foreign
governments-is not to be permitted").
88. See Sarah Rumpf, Texas Rep. Villalba Files Bill That Criminalizes Bloggers, Citizens Filming
Cops, BREITBART (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/texas/2015/03/13/texas-rep-villalba-files-bill-
that-criminalizes-bloggers-citizens-filming-cops/ [https://perma.cc/RQP5-FKKS] (describing Texas State
Representative Jason Villalba's repeated defense of the proposed bill and quoting Representative
Villalba's tweet saying that "HB 2918 is meant to protect officers, NOT restrict the ability to keep them
accountable. It DOES NOT prohibit filming").
89. See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 604 (7th Cir. 2012) ("In the end, we think it unlikely
that strict scrutiny will apply.").
90. Lexi Belculfine, North Side Woman Found Guilty of Interfering with Police Duties, PITTSBURGH
PosT-GAZETTE (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2015/08/27/North-Side-woman-
found-guilty-of-interfering-with-police-duties/stories/201508270204 [http://perma.cc/KMU6-HHSB].
91. See H.B. 2918, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
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Even if a court does not believe that state action restricting recording is
content-based, recognizing the in-the-moment expression of recording the po-
lice also has implications for restrictions on either content-based or content-
neutral state actions. Although a state can place reasonable "time, place, or
manner" restrictions on public speech, those restrictions must be "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest., 92 For police officers,
public safety is paramount-and certainly a significant governmental interest.
But public safety is not the same as efficiency-an officer cannot intrude on free
speech in order to do police work in the best way possible; she can only limit
free speech in order to protect public safety. As the Court explained in Hill, the
First Amendment requires "some sacrifice of [government] efficiency ... to the
forces of private opposition., 93 As a result, to group the act of recording into
the bundle of possible actions that can potentially inhibit public safety is to cast
the net too widely.
The second tenet of drawing the boundaries of permissible state actions
restricting the recording of officers-including reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions-should thus be that government officials cannot claim that
recording interferes with police work unless that interference constitutes a
physical obstruction to that police work.9 4 A hypothetical from Hill provides a
useful example. There, the Court analyzed the conduct of a hypothetical person
who runs alongside an officer and shouts at him while he is in the line of duty.
The majority in Hill says that such conduct may sometimes constitute interfer-
ence, but only because of a physical interference: "what is of concern in that
example is not simply contentious speech, but rather the possibility that by
shouting and running beside the officer the person may physically obstruct the
officer's investigation., 95 It is the running, not the shouting. If you bring the
Hill hypothetical into the present day and place a smartphone in the hypotheti-
cal runner's hand, the only point at which that runner can lawfully be asked to
stop what she is doing is if she is physically in the way of the officer's
investigation. Any other form of interference-screaming, recording, asking
questions-is protected First Amendment activity, even if it does "interfere"
with what an officer is trying to do in the lay meaning of the term.96 A physical
92. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
93. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 463 n.12 (quoting Note, Types of Activity Encompassed by
the Offense of Obstructing a Public Officer, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 388, 407 (1960)).
94. See Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014) ("[A] police order that is specifically directed
at the First Amendment right to film police performing their duties in public may be constitutionally
imposed only if the officer can reasonably conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to
interfere, with his duties."); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) ("[P]eaceful recording of
an arrest in a public space that does not interfere with the police officers' performance of their duties is
not reasonably subject to limitation.").
95. Hill, 482 U.S. at462 n.il.
96. See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 8.
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impediment to public safety would not have to involve touching a police officer
per se. One can imagine, for instance, someone jumping between an officer and
an individual that officer is attempting to handcuff or someone physically
obstructing the work of firefighters or emergency medical technicians. But here,
as in the prior example, holding a camera in hand adds nothing to this public
safety risk.
This is why it is necessary to remember the values underlying the First
Amendment right to record. If the central purpose served by the right is to
protect the ability of civilians to capture moving images and disseminate those
images in the future, then it is not especially problematic to ban the filming of
police officers within less than twenty-five feet-surely a spectator can film
police conduct well enough from thirty feet away. But because the right is also
about the ability of civilians to contest police practices in the moment-to
convey with their smartphones that they have their eye on the officer-
bystanders must be allowed to interfere to some degree with the peace, quiet,
and distance that all police officers surely wish that they had from the public.
For, in the end, police officers are public servants, sworn to protect the block
rather than to own it. And when the people the police are sworn to protect
choose to make the powerful gesture of recording the police in public, our
Constitution requires that we let them make that statement.
CONCLUSION
Police leaders report that officers around the country feel "under siege.",
97
Although recording police officers in public may not present quite the threat to
effective law enforcement that these leaders contend-FBI Director Comey, for
example, admitted that he had no evidence to support his proposition 98 -the
feeling of being under siege is in some ways understandable. Recording police
on the job is a threat to police power writ large. The ubiquity of smartphones
has meant a shift in power dynamics between the police and the residents of the
neighborhoods that they police. As courts around the country continue to
grapple with the meaning and the limits of the First Amendment right to record,
they should remember that observation is a form of power, especially when
backed up by the record button, and that the populations who most frequently
97. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
98. See Ciara McCarthy & Sabrina Siddiqui, FBI Director Concedes he has Little Evidence to
Support 'Ferguson Effect,' THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/
oct/26/fbi-director- ferguson-effect-crime-policing-james-comey [perma.cc/7NNH-Q6E2].
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interact with the police-poor people of color-are also the populations with
relatively little political power.99 Unless we want to continue to allow the police
to "own" the block, we need to protect methods of expression that give some
ownership of public space back to the people who call it home.
99. See generally TRACI BURCH, TRADING DEMOCRACY FOR JUSTICE: CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AND THE
DECLINE OF NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 75-104 (2013) (describing lack of political power of
poor populations of color from which the majority of prison populations come); AMY E. LERMAN &
VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL
199-231 (2014) (describing alienation and withdrawal from political life of individuals who had
contact with the criminal justice system via stops, arrests, or confinement); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 63-120 (2011) (describing a historical trajectory in which
democratic participation dies out for African American communities affected by both crime and the
criminal justice system); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in
African-American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1291-98 (2004) (describing how mass
incarceration in African-American communities erodes those communities' ability to cultivate political
power and affect the system).
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